Counterproductive Information Operations

Lessons from Russia on why some operations fail

[Originally a Twitter thread.]

This is a fantastic piece by Thomas Rid about self-deception in Russia’s covert influence apparatus.

I think it’s very likely that Chinese online influence operations are subject to the same dynamic he describes: “The SDA’s claims… were read and interpreted by Russian officials and intelligence officers who probably did not understand how public opinion is actually shaped in open societies.”

I think covert pro-PRC online influence campaigns, at least in the US, have been not just ineffective but have actually harmed Beijing’s interests. They continue partly because the organizations involved are probably misjudging their effects. The inherent secrecy and compartmentation involved in these types of campaigns makes it more difficult for top decision makers to get accurate information about their impact and increases the influence of the bureaucracies directly overseeing them. In China’s case this may be exacerbated by a lack of independent oversight mechanisms inside and outside government.

When oversight works well, it can prevent or contain poorly conceived or executed operations. I was reminded of the contrasting example of DOD reportedly reviewing counterproductive influence operations after they were exposed and subject to intra-governmental criticism - something that would be much harder in China’s system.

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